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 A. Kocornik-Mina, T.K.J. McDermott, G. Michaels and F. Rauch, submitted 2015. 
Our 100-year supply of natural gas is a big factor in drawing jobs back to
our shores. Many are in manufacturing-the quintessential middle-class job.
During the last decade, it was widely accepted that American manufacturing
was in irreversible decline. [...] And today, American manufacturing has
added more than 700,000 new jobs. It’s growing almost twice as fast as the
rest of the economy. And more than half of all manufacturing executives
have said they’re actively looking at bringing jobs back from China.1
- President Barack Obama
We came to the conclusion this -the shale revolution- will be a sustainable
advantage for the United States. That is why we are comfortable making an
investment.2
- Hans-Ulrich Engel, BASF North America Chief
1 Introduction
The United States is in the midst of an energy revolution. It all started in the 1980s with
the independent company founded by the late George Mitchell. The company had been
experimenting with application of different techniques of hydraulic fracturing-a well
stimulation technique in which rock is fractured by a hydraulically pressurized liquid-
of the Barnett Shale of Texas, eventually finding the right technique to economically
extract the natural gas in the formation. The combination of hydraulic fracturing and
directional drilling-the practice for drilling non vertical wells-was then widely adopted
by the gas industry in turn spawning a natural gas boom in North America in the 2000s.
The surge in the production of shale gas has made the United States the largest natural
gas producer in the world. As exemplified by the above quotes, the shale gas revolution
has since then sparked an academic and policy debate on the potential implications of
such revolution on the U.S. economy. Anecdotal evidence from news reports indicate
that the dynamics in capacity expansions have accelerated as a result of U.S. shale, with
non U.S.-based chemical producers having recently announced USD 72 billion worth of
investment in new plants.3
The present paper provides the first empirical evidence of the newly found compar-
ative advantage of the United States manufacturing sector following the so-called shale
gas revolution. The revolution has led to (very) large and persistent differences in the
price of natural gas between the United States and the rest of the world owing to the
physics of natural gas. Results show that U.S. manufacturing exports have grown by
about 6 percent on account of their energy intensity since the onset of the shale revolu-
tion. We also document that the U.S. shale revolution is operating both at the intensive
1Excerpt from remarks at Northwestern University on October 2, 2014. See
http://www.whitehouse.gov.
2Excerpt from an interview with Bloomberg News on June 27, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com
3See http://www.bloomberg.com.
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and extensive margins.
Natural gas has the lowest energy density, measured by the amount of energy stored
in a given unit of matter, among fossil fuels (petroleum products, natural gas, and
coal).4 Even with pipelines, long distance trade of natural gas from the point of extrac-
tion becomes uneconomical quickly, as the gas in the pipeline needs to be cooled and
pressurized, which uses up significant amounts of energy. Liquefaction at origin and re-
gasification at destination are the only other means for long distance trade. However,
the laws of physics governing liquefaction and re-gasification, imply an exogenously
given lower bound on the transport cost. This suggests, that natural gas markets are
much less integrated compared to markets for other fossil fuels.
Given the physical limits to directly trade natural gas, its not surprising that, fol-
lowing the shale gas production boom in the U.S., natural gas prices have fallen sharply
in recent years and are effectively decoupled from those in the rest of the world.5 For
instance, in August 2014 U.S. natural gas price sold 4 dollars per million British ther-
mal units, compared to 10 dollars in Europe and close to 17 dollars in Asia. Cheaper
energy prices in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world could have dramatic con-
sequences on the manufacturing sector. For instance, the petrochemical industry and
other industries that are able to utilize natural gas will pass these lower input prices
downstream through the value chain. Figure 1 show that the rise in U.S. manufactur-
ing exports weighted by their energy intensity mirrors the rise in price gap between
the U.S. and the rest of the world. In contrast, the energy content of U.S. imports has
roughly stagnated.6 This paper aims at investigating systematically the consequences
of lower natural gas prices in the United States on the external competitiveness of U.S.
manufacturing.
A burgeoning literature has attempted to document the economic consequences of
lower energy prices and specifically natural gas prices following the shale gas revo-
lution. Existing literature typically focuses on localized economic effects of the shale
gas boom in turn exploiting within-country variation in natural gas prices as opposed
to between-country variation. These papers study the direct effects of resource extrac-
tion activity on local economic structure and are very much related to the literature
on Dutch disease.7 Available estimates indicate that the energy boom in the U.S. has
4Natural gas is also the cleanest source of energy among fossil fuels and does not suffer from the kind
of environmental liabilities potentially associated with nuclear power generation.
5The U.S. shale revolution also led to a substantial increase in oil production. As stated earlier, oil does
not however share the physical properties of natural gas in turn oil markets are much more integrated
than natural gas markets. While both the shale oil and gas booms have led to lower world average energy
prices compared to what they would have been without these booms, the shale gas boom in particular has
increased the dispersion in regional prices.
6Appendix Figure A2 documents the tight relationship between shale gas production and the growing
energy intensity of exports, while Appendix Figure A3 documents a similar pattern when considering
energy intensive sector trade share not based on weighting by the input-output table estimated energy
intensities, but by focusing on a set of three digit sectors that are particularly energy intensive.
7See for example Allcott and Keniston (2013), Fetzer (2014) and Agerton et al. (2014) in the context
of the US and Arago´n and Rud (2013), Sachs and Warner (1995), van Wijnbergen (1984) in context of
developing countries.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Energy Content of Imports and Exports.
Notes: On the left axis the figure presents U.S. manufacturing exports and imports weighted by their
energy intensity according to energy cost shares derived from the 2002 U.S. input-output table. The right
axis presents the industrial use natural gas price gap between the U.S. and OECD Europe.
created between 400,000 and 600,000 new jobs over the last 10 years (see Agerton et al.,
2014; Fetzer, 2014; Boudiaf and Yegorov, 2012). Hausman and Kellogg (2015) find that
the shale gas revolution has led to an increase in welfare for natural gas consumers
and producers of $48 billion per year.8 Energy price variation within the U.S. may help
understand why local booms may not induce a structural shift away from manufactur-
ing (see Fetzer, 2014). These differences in local natural gas prices could however be
thought as relatively smaller and may prove to be temporary compared to differences
between the United States and the rest of world. This paper complements this literature
by focusing on the trade implications of the shale revolution, in addition to using data
on investment in new and expanding plants at the county level. To the extent of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to do so.
This paper also relates to the strand of literature investigating the decline in U.S.
manufacturing beginning in 2001 (see Figure A1). This strand of literature focuses on
the employment implications of U.S. trade liberalization vis-a-vis China. Implicitly that
amounts to testing the importance of China’s comparative advantage in terms of lower
labor costs. For instance, Pierce and Schott (2012b) find evidence for the link between
8Two recent studies have exploited sector level data to isolate the effect effect of lower energy prices
on the manufacturing sector but not on trade. Using industry-level data, Melick (2014) estimates that
the fall in the price of natural gas since 2006 is associated with a 2.3 percent increase in activity for the
entire manufacturing sector, with much larger effects of 30 percent or more for the most energy-intensive
industries. Celasun et al. (2014) find that a doubling of the natural gas price differential in favor of the
home country would increase manufacturing industrial production by 1.5 percent.
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the sharp drop in U.S. manufacturing employment and a change in U.S. trade policy
that eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese imports. Harrison and McMillan
(2006) using firm-level data find that off-shoring by U.S. based multinationals is associ-
ated with a quantitatively small decline in manufacturing employment.9 Less attention
has however been paid to the recent recovery in the U.S. manufacturing sector and the
change in composition in U.S. exports. Our contribution to this literature is to docu-
ment systematically evidence of a noticeable turn around in U.S. manufacturing exports
owing to U.S. newly found comparative advantage in terms of lower natural gas prices.
We argue that the difference in natural gas prices between the U.S. and the rest of the
world is not transitory, but rather persistent in nature due to the physical properties
of natural gas and the distance to foreign markets. The sizable gap in natural gas
prices between the U.S. and the rest of the world might to some degree help limit U.S.
comparative ”dis-advantage” in terms of labor costs.
Our paper also relates to the pure theory of trade that emphasizes the role of dif-
ferences in the availability of productive factors in explaining trade. This dates back
at least to Rybczynski (1955) theorem that states that when the amount of one factor
of production increases, the production of the good which uses that particular factor
of production intensively increases while the good that uses that factor less intensively
will decrease, at a given relative factor price. Rybczynski’s analysis was originally de-
veloped in a closed economy setting but was prominently extended in the two-country
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) framework. In that setting, an increase in a specific fac-
tor endowment in the home country may lead that country to export more of the good
that is intensive in that factor and the foreign country to decrease its export of that
very same good. More recently, Bernard and Jensen (2007) allows for a more complex
understanding of the importance of factor endowment in a framework derived from
new trade theory allowing for both monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms
(e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004).10 Another relevant area of research in trade ex-
tends the relevance of comparative advantage to intangible factors. For instance, Nunn
(2007) find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production
of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important.11.
Empirical tests of theories predicting the factor content of trade have been mixed.
However, Davis and Weinstein (1998) show that with a small number of amendments
9Autor David H. and Hanson (2013) analyze the effect of rising Chinese import competition between
1990 and 2007 on US local labor markets. The authors find that rising imports cause higher unemployment,
lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets that house import-competing
manufacturing industries. Import competition explains one-quarter of the contemporaneous aggregate
decline in US manufacturing employment.
10Bernard and Jensen (2007) framework simultaneously explains ”why some countries export more in
certain industries than in others (endowment-driven comparative advantage), why nonetheless two-way
trade is observed within industries (firm-level horizontal product differentiation combined with increasing
returns to scale) and why, within industries engaged in these two forms of trade, some firms export and
others do not (self-selection driven by trade costs)”. In this paper, we exploit sector level data to document
the former and also document the extensive margin of trade including using county level data.
11See also related work by Berger et al. (2013), Guiso et al. (2009) and Bahar et al. (2014).
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including technical differences and a failure of factor price equalization the HOV model
perform relatively well in that countries export their abundant factors and do so with
the right magnitudes.12 In other words, trade theory reliability predicts that a coun-
try facing relative abundance in one factor of production such as shale gas in the U.S.
would indirectly export that factor by exporting more of the goods that are intensive
in that specific factor. 13 In this paper, we argue that the U.S. shale gas revolution pro-
vide a quasi-natural experiment to test the importance of factor endowment in shaping
patterns of U.S. trade.
To do so we systematically investigate the response of U.S. manufacturing exports
to the plausibly exogenous variation stemming from the interaction between the differ-
ences in natural gas prices between the U.S. and the rest of the world and the energy
intensity of manufacturing sector exports. Estimation results of gravity models show
that the U.S. manufacturing exports have grown by about 6 percent on account of their
energy intensity since the onset of the shale gas boom. Using a data-set of investment in
new and expanding manufacturing plants, we also document that the U.S. shale revolu-
tion is operating both at the intensive and extensive margins with new manufacturing
sector capacity being added in the energy intensive industries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the physics
of natural gas and its implications for trade costs. Section 3 describes the various
data-sets used and lays out the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results.
Section 5 discusses robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Physics of Natural Gas
Differences in regional natural gas prices are fundamentally determined by the laws of
physics through the bearing the latter have on both transformation and transportation
costs. For pipeline transportation, the cost relates to the frictions that arise as natural
gas travels through pipelines. Natural gas transportation via pipelines between the U.S.
and other major markets such as Europe and Asia is however not a viable option, due
to the long distance natural gas would need to travel. This requires re-compression
along the way due to the natural friction, which is not possible beneath the sea surface
given existing technology. To be traded, U.S. natural gas would thus need to be shipped
and that requires liquefaction. For liquefaction of natural gas, the costs arise due to the
work required to compress and cool down natural gas to achieve a phase change from
gas to liquid. This occurs at temperatures of around -160 degrees celsius (-256 degrees
Fahrenheit). The gas is then compressed to only 1/600th its original volume. Natural
gas has a heating value of around Q = 890kJ/mole. The minimum energy required
12For empirical test of HOV trade theory see also Harrigan (1995) and Harrigan (1997), Bernstein and
Weinstein (2002) and Maskus and Webster (1999) among others.
13Debaere (2014) provides empirical evidence that water is a source of comparative advantage and that
relatively water abundant countries export more water-intensive products. He finds that water contributes
significantly less to the pattern of exports than the traditional production factors labor and physical capital.
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to liquefy natural gas is implied by the first law of thermodynamics. This minimum
energy requirement has two components. First, there is an energy requirement in order
to cool down natural gas. The amount of energy required for that is dictated by the
specific heat of natural gas. The specific heat of substance measures how thermally
insensitive it is to the addition of energy. A larger value for the specific heat means
that more energy must be added for any given mass in order to achieve a change in
temperature. For natural gas that constant is given by cp = 2.098 Jg , meaning that 2.098
Joules of energy are required to achieve a 1 degree change per gram of natural gas
at constant pressure. The second component of the energy requirement is the energy
required to achieve a phase change. A phase change consists in the change in physical
properties from gaseous to liquid and then to solid. A phase change does not involve a
change in temperature but rather a change in the internal energy of the substance. The
amount of energy required to achieve a phase change from gaseous to liquid is given
by the substances latent heat of vaporization, for natural gas that is DHv = 502J/g.
From the above, we can compute the implied minimal energy required to cool down
natural gas and achieve a phase change as follows:
Ql,min =Wl,min = cpDT + DHv
.
The minimal energy required to liquefy natural gas from 20 degrees to -160 degrees
is 14.1 kJ/mole. This does not seem that significant in relation to the heat content of
890 kJ/mole, accounting for only 1.6% of the heat content. However, the actual work
required is a lot higher since the energy required to cool down and achieve the phase
change is obtained from other physical processes involving the burning of fuel. These
processes are far from achieving a 100% energy conversion efficiency. The actual work
required can be expressed as:
Wl =
Wl,min
el ⇥ ew
,
where ew is the energy conversion efficiency of converting methane to electricity
and el is the efficiency factor for conversion to liquids. These shares are significantly
lower than 1. The Department of Energy estimates that ew = 35%, while el may range
between 15% - 40% (see Wegrzyn et al. (1998)). This suggest that the energy costs for
liquefaction can range anywhere between 100kJ - 268 kJ, suggesting energy losses range
between 11.2%-30% from the liquefaction process alone.
In addition, there are losses associated with the re-gasification process; furthermore,
there are costs for transport, storage, and operating costs along the whole value chain.
All these accrue in addition to the conversion costs implied by the laws of physics. A
recent analysis of a proposed LNG plant in Cyprus suggests that the minimum lique-
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faction costs are 1.4 times the cost of the natural gas feedstock.14
The inherent costs associated with transforming and transporting natural gas thus
suggest that domestic natural gas prices in the U.S. will remain significantly lower
compared to Europe and Asia in the foreseeable future. In the following, we investigate
systematically whether the shale gas revolution is a source of comparative advantage
for U.S. manufacturing. The next section presents the data used and the main empirical
specifications.
3 Data and Empirical Specification
To explore the effect of the shale revolution on U.S. trade, we proceed in three steps.
First, we study the overall effect of the revolution on manufacturing exports and im-
ports. Second, we explore the extensive margin of the trade effect, by examining
whether U.S. manufacturing exports and energy intensive ones in particular, have reached
newer trading partners. Third, we examine the extent to which the effect of the shale
revolution on U.S. trade has been channeled through the addition of new production
capacity.
3.1 Exports and Imports
The trade data are from Schott (2004). In addition, we use concordances provided by
Peter Schott and the Bureau of Economic Affairs to match input-output tables data to
the foreign trade harmonized codes. The resulting data-set used in our main analysis
of U.S. exports is a balanced panel of five digit sector level data using North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) mapped to destination countries. There are 167
manufacturing sector codes at the five digit level. There are 233 destination countries
and 17 years of data from 1996-2012. Overall this amounts to 661,487 observations. Not
all observations have positive trade, in which case a zero is reported.15 That allows us
to study the extensive margin of trade as well, i.e. trade occurring for new products
and country pairs.16
The dependent variable in our specifications is either, the level of exports or the
14See Natural Gas Monetization Pathways for Cyprus, MIT Energy Initiative, http://mitei.mit.edu.
15The main results presented in this paper are very similar, when we estimate Poisson models to account
for the fact, that about 38% of the observations are zero (See Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). These results are
available from the authors upon request.
16See Appendix A.1 for details. Note that the trade data can be matched with the 7 digit NAICS industry
classification level, however, the best concordance between the six digit Input-Output tables and the trade
data is achieved at the 5 digit NAICS sector classification. The trade data also contains information on U.S.
customs district, where the export data was recorded. We remove this dimension, primarily to reduce the
dimensionality of the balanced panel. Note that, at the five digit sector, there are 167 five digit industries,
while there are 233 countries for 17 years of data. This renders the sample already substantial with roughly
661,487 observations. If we add the customs district origin dimension, this would result in a balanced panel
with around 30 million observations. Out of these, only around 4 million observations are non-zero on
either imports or exports side. Appendix A.3 explores the trade effects when accounting for the customs
origin district on an unbalanced panel to exploit within US natural gas price differences.
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logarithm of exports or a dummy that takes that value of 1 if there is non-zero trade
following three consecutive years of no trade and 0 otherwise. We estimate two main
empirical specifications that are introduced in turn.
Non-Parametric Estimation We first focus on the non-parametric specification which
takes the following form:
Xijt = ait + bij +Â
t
gt ⇥ Ej + ecijt (1)
This specification controls for destination specific time fixed effects ait, with i indi-
cating the destination, while t is the time-dimension. In addition, we control for five
digit sector code j by destination i fixed effects bij. The trade-pair specific time fixed
effects ait controls for time varying shocks that are specific to the trade-pair. Some ex-
amples of variables that would be perfectly collinear with these fixed effects are general
demand shifters, such as annual GDP, population, and exchange rates. The second set
of fixed effects controls for general trade pair and product specific demand shifters.
These would capture any time-invariant factors that affect say demand from China for
U.S. energy intensive exports. These fixed effects capture for instance bilateral distance
and other time-invariant sector specific trade frictions. All identifying variation is thus
coming from the variation in energy intensity measured by Ej across sector codes. To
construct energy intensity, we choose to use the 2002 Bureau of Economic Analysis
Input-Output tables-prevailing before the shale boom-at the five digit NAICS industry
classification level. Later input-output tables could also be used, in particular the 2007
version. This is problematic, given the fact that technology coefficients derived from
later input-output tables are endogenous and would thus potentially bias our regres-
sion estimates (see e.g. Morrow and Trefler, 2014). 17 We distinguish energy consumed
from all sources (in particular electricity and natural gas); alternatively, we focus exclu-
sively on natural gas consumption. In both cases, energy can be consumed directly and
indirectly, through intermediate goods consumption. Using overall energy intensity
allows us to account for potential substitution effects between natural gas and other
energy sources.18 Using only natural gas consumption allows us to get closer to the
source of the comparative advantage. Table 1 provides an overview of energy intensi-
ties by their input-output table shares at the three digit sector level; in addition, the size
of sectors relative to the overall economy is reported. The most energy intensive sec-
tors are, not surprisingly, Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing, Primary Metal
Manufacturing, Non-metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing and Chemical Manufac-
turing.
We are interested in the evolution of the coefficients gt over time; positive coef-
ficients would indicate that export of energy intensive products is growing stronger,
17The details of the construction are discussed in appendix A.2.
18This help allay some of the concerns that arise because we use input-output tables related to pre-shale
boom era for a specific year implicitly assuming that the production technology is fixed.
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relative to non-energy intensive sectors. The results from the non-parametric exercise
are presented graphically. The non-parametric analysis highlight the evolution of trade
volumes accounting for the energy intensity of the respective products. The coeffi-
cients are difficult to interpret but could help confirm the strong relationship with the
emerging natural gas price gaps. In order to ease interpretation, we estimate the same
specification parametrically.
Parametric Estimation In the non-parametric specification, we allowed the estimated
coefficient g to change over time. We can also rely on time-variation coming from a
measure of the endowment shock which allows us to estimate a single coefficient. In
table form, we present evidence from such a parametric approach. The specification is
as follows:
Xijt = ait + bij + g⇥ Ej ⇥ DPt + eijt, (2)
The fixed effects are as before, however, now we exploit the time-variation in the
price gap in natural gas between the U.S. and the rest of the world, as captured in
Pt. The rest of the world prices are proxied by the average price of natural gas in
OECD Europe countries, constructed by the International Energy Administration. As
discussed earlier, the price differences arise due to the shale gas production boom,
which has been widely unanticipated. The price differences cannot be arbitraged away
directly, due to the inherent physical properties of natural gas discussed in the previous
section. Pure trade theory predicts that the U.S. would export natural gas indirectly
through value added in the form of processed goods for which trade costs relative to
the value of the good are sufficiently lower. Using the price gap as an interaction term
makes it particularly easy to interpret the coefficients. In the main tables, we focus on
US exports to all countries. However, we also restrict the analysis to OECD countries
where we do have trading country natural gas price data. While the OECD countries
are only 28 countries out of a total of 233 destinations, they account for more than 62 %
of the value of all US exports in 2005.19 For this subset, the interaction term in the above
specification will be Ej⇥DPit. We would not expect the estimated coefficients to change
dramatically using a more comprehensive set of price gaps. Indeed, the variation in the
price gaps that is relevant is not driven by prices changing elsewhere in the world,
but rather by U.S. prices dropping dramatically. Alternative measures to account for
the U.S. shale gas boom could be used, such as levels of shale-gas production or the
estimated level of reserves in the interaction terms. Our results are robust to using
these variables, yet, the coefficients are much more difficult to interpret. To explore
the underlying mechanisms driving export expansion, we separate the intensive- and
extensive margins. To study the intensive margin of the effect of the shale revolution on
19That observation is consistent with Easterly and Reshef (2009) who document the remarkably high
degrees of concentration in manufacturing exports. In other words, manufacturing exports tend to be
dominated by a few ”big hits”, which account for most of export value.
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U.S. trade, we focus the analysis on trade pairs that had been trading a specific good
throughout the sample period running from 1996 to 2012. In practice, we estimate the
specification ( 1) on this subset. To study the extensive margin of trade, we use an
analogous specification except that the dependent variable is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if there is non-zero trade for product j to a destination country i at
time t following three consecutive years of no trade. The second important margin that
we study is whether the manufacturing sector is actually expanding in real terms, that
is through the construction of new manufacturing capacity inside the U.S. We do so by
exploiting plant level construction data.
3.2 Capital Expenditure
To explore whether new production capacity is being added, we estimate two specifica-
tions, which are analogous to the one used earlier for exports. The main non-parametric
specification is:
Dcjst = acj + dst +Â
t
gt ⇥ Ej + ecjst, (3)
where Dcjst = 1 if a sector j invests in an investment project in year t and county j in
state s. We perform that analysis lumping capacity additions and new plants together.
We also separately estimate these specifications focusing on new plant construction
alone. The data we use is proprietary data on plant expansion and new plants collected
by Conway. Conway collects data for capital expenditure and they are considered to
have most extensive U.S. coverage.20 For a project to be included in the data set, it
needs to meet at least one of the following criteria: (1) the project cost should be at least
USD 1 million, (2) covering at least 20,000 sq. ft. or (3) create employment for at least
50 people.
The data is available at the zip code level and provides the number of jobs created,
and the size of the capital expenditure as well as the NAICS industry classification. We
perform the analysis at the county level rather than the zip code level. Since we are
not relying on the spatial variation, going to that finer level would not add much to
the analysis. Furthermore, not all sectors are classified up to the 6 digit industry code.
However, 98% of projects provide NAICS codes at least at the 3-digit industry level.
Hence, we construct the panel at that level.21
20Some subsets of the data has been used in previous research studying the impact of capital expendi-
tures in the manufacturing sector on local economic structure (See Greenstone et al. (2010), Greenstone
and Moretti (2003)).
21For the robustness, we also construct the panel at the five digit industry level. This comes at a cost,
as we need to assign investment projects, that were classified only at the three digit NAICS level to a five
digit industry code. That requires us to make some assumptions. We try to find the best matching five
digit NAICS industry code, based on matching the textual description of the capital expenditure project
to the five digit NAICS sector description. Note that at the 5 digit industry level, the panel becomes rather
large, since there are 167 five digit sectors, rendering a sample with around 5.8 million observations, out
of which the vast majority are zeroes.
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As before acj are county by 3-digit industry fixed effects; while dst are state by year
fixed effects. That regression will yield a set of coefficients that can be plotted. A
parametric approach is presented in tables, where we use the time variation from the
price gap between the U.S. and OECD Europe.
Dcjst = acj + dst + g⇥ Ej ⇥ DPt + ecjt (4)
In addition to this dummy-variable specification, we also present results with the
number of projects, the level of investment and the number of jobs created. Further-
more, we distinguish between the results stemming from new manufacturing plants
versus capacity expansions, to explore whether we are only capturing additions to ex-
isting capacity.
The key concern with this specification is that we may be capturing the direct effects
of the resource boom in addition to the extensive margin investment response due to a
built-up to export natural gas through value added. While we can not entirely rule that
out, constraining the sample to the counties that do not have shale resources, we obtain
qualitatively similar results.
The next section presents the main results on the export response to the shale gas
revolution. This is then further refined into the margins of response: intensive margin
of trade and measures of the extensive margin of trade, along with a study of manufac-
turing sector capacity additions.
4 Results
4.1 Exports/Imports
Results showing the non-parametric evolution of exports for energy intensive sectors
over time are presented first. That non-parametric approach implies that we refrain
from imposing structure. Figure 2 presents non-parametric specification results. The
estimated coefficients for import as well as exports are plotted out.
It should be noted that the interaction for the import-specification is somewhat prob-
lematic as it does not reflect the energy intensity of production sectors in the rest of the
world vis-a-vis the US. Instead, it assumes that the rest of the world has access to the
same production technology as the U.S. as represented by the respective energy in-
tensity. However, one would not expect the energy intensity for identical industrial
processes to be exhibiting significant differences, especially for the set of OECD coun-
tries.
The coefficients from the non parametric estimation suggests that exports for energy
intensive sectors have grown disproportionally, while imports have stalled. The coeffi-
cient for 2012 indicates that exports have grown by 2.5 log points for a sector that uses
only energy as input. It is not straightforward to translate this non-parametric estimate
into a proportional change due to the complications of interpreting interacted dummy
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variables in such a setup.22 The key observation is that the growth in exports coincides
with the emergence of the natural gas price gaps.
Figure 2: Energy Intensive Industry Export Growth Over Time. The figure presents
regression coefficients from non-parametric specification interacting energy intensity
with year fixed effects, while controlling for trading country and year fixed effects,
three digit industry sector time fixed effects and commodity by trading country pair
fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals from standard errors, clustered at the two-digit
by destination/ origin region level are presented in dotted lines.
Results from the parametric estimation are presented in this section and allow for a
more direct interpretation of the results. Results are presented in Table 2. The depen-
dent variable is the logarithm of the export value. The coefficient on the interaction can
be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. The estimated coefficient in column (2) of Panel A
implies that a 1 dollar increase in the price gap, increases exports by 21.5% provided
that the sector under consideration uses 100% energy as an input (i.e. a sector which
only uses energy). For Chemical Manufacturing, which has a total energy cost share of
8.33 %, this translates into an increase in exports of 8.33%⇥ 21.5% = 1.79% for every
dollar that the price gap increases. Given that the price gap has increased to almost USD
10 since 2005, this represents an increase in exports for this sector by 17.9%. Overall,
our estimation results show that the U.S. manufacturing exports have grown by about 6
percent on account of their energy intensity since the onset of the shale gas revolution.
As expected, the results using refined measures of the price gap in the other panels
of Table 2 are not dramatically different, since the U.S. shale gas boom leaves prices
elsewhere unaffected due to the lack of integration of natural gas markets. In Appendix
Table A4 we separately analyze imports. No consistent pattern emerges, suggesting that
22See Kennedy (1981).
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import levels of goods that are energy intensive do not change dramatically in response
to the shale gas boom.23 A core prediction from the HOV framework is that in response
to the endowment shock, exports of non-energy intensive goods should fall. This can
be tested by interacting the measure of the exposure of the endowment shock with a
measure of the non-energy intensity of a particular sector. The main other factors of
production are capital and labor.
The results are presented in Table 7. The coefficient on the interaction between
energy intensity and the price gap does not change, when we include additional inter-
action terms capturing the sectors relative labor- or capital intensity. But more impor-
tantly, the coefficients on both other terms are negative and significant. This is very
much in line with the simple predictions derived from a HOV framework.24
4.2 Margins of Trade
In this section, we attempt to separate between the intensive and extensive margins of
U.S. trade response to the shale gas revolution.
4.2.1 Intensive Margin
In this section, we focus on country- and sector- pairs for which there has been non-
zero trade for the whole time period. That applies to 17,341 out of 39,955 pairs. The
results are presented in Table 3. The coefficients are similar to those in the main table; if
anything, they are slightly larger suggesting that the bulk of the overall estimated effect
is coming from intensive margin expansion of energy intensive trade.
4.2.2 Extensive Margin
In order to ascertain whether the U.S. trade response to the shale gas revolution oper-
ates at the extensive margin, we explore whether new trade is occurring on sectors by
destination pairs for energy intensive sectors. The dependent variable is a dummy that
takes that value of 1 if there is non-zero trade following three consecutive years of no
trade and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in table 4. The coefficients associated
with the various measures of energy intensity strongly positive. The coefficient in Panel
A of column (2) suggest that, for a good that uses 100% energy input, the observed ex-
tensive margin increase is 0.33 percentage points. This is a large relative increase of
10.6%, given that such transitions are relatively rare in the data and occur only for 3%
of trade pairs.25
23The assumption here is that the U.S. production technology captured by the input-output table coeffi-
cients maps well into the available production technologies elsewhere.
24We obtain very similar results when using the further refined measures for the price gap as discussed
in the main text. These are available on request.
25In Appendix Table A5 we present evidence of the extensive margin of the shale gas revolution on
energy intensive imports; no statistically significant pattern emerges.
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4.2.3 New Manufacturing Capacity
To further explore the extensive margin of the trade response, we investigate whether
expansions or actual new plants are being added especially in the energy intensive
sectors.
Figure 3 uses direct energy cost share from the 2002 Input Output tables interacted
with a set of year effects. The left hand side here is a dummy that takes the value
of 1 if a county in a sector experienced some capital expenditure in a given year, and
zero otherwise. The omitted year is 2003 where the capital expenditure data begins.
The coefficient pattern suggests that energy intensive manufacturing sectors were more
likely to invest in additional and new capacity from 2008 onwards relative to the base
year 2003. The coefficients vary a lot more from year to year, but are consistently
positive. This suggests that the manufacturing sector is adding new productive capacity
in response to the shale gas boom.
Figure 3: Capital Expenditure and Energy Intensity Over Time
We can further refine these results by studying completely new capital expenditures
relative to expansions of existing capacities. We present that in Table 5. Column (1) is a
simple linear probability model of whether there has been any capital expenditure in a
district and county by industry. The mean of the dependent variable indicates that 2.9%
of county-and sector pairs experience some capital expenditure over the whole sample
period. The estimated coefficient is 0.109. As the price gap between the US and OECD
Europe has increased to USD 10, this coefficient can be interpreted as follows. Given
the price gap of USD 10, the likelihood of capital expenditure for an industry that has
an energy intensity of 5% would increase by around 1.95%.
The coefficients in columns (2) - (4) are interpreted as semi-elasticities. The results
in column (3) indicate that, for an average US manufacturing sector, the increase in the
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price gap by about USD 10 between the US and OECD Europe has increased investment
by 2.67%, ceteris paribus.
The results in Panel B indicate that the results are strongly driven by capital ex-
penditure for completely new investment projects, rather than capacity additions. The
share of capital projects that are completely new is a lot lower, around 1.29% of counties
experience some completely new capacity expansion. The underlying reason for why
these investments occur certainly lies in the expectation that the shale gas boom will
lead to a price differentials that will persist for the years to come.
A main concern with this analysis, exploiting variation within the U.S., is that we
pick up the direct effects from the shale gas boom. While we can not rule this out
as some of the capacity additions documented in the data may be directly related to
the Oil and Gas industry, when removing counties where shale deposits lie, we obtain
qualitatively similar results. That suggests that we are not solely picking up the direct
spillover from the shale gas boom (see Table A7).
5 Robustness
This section explores four main robustness checks namely to measurement of energy
intensity, accounting for variation in regional prices within the U.S., the degree to which
the shock to comparative advantage may be correlated with a secular trend away from
labor intensive to energy intensive manufacturing, and accounting for price differences.
Measure of Energy Intensity Instead of relying on the constructed measure Ej, we
can also proxy that measure of energy intensity, by interacting sector dummies with the
price gap. That then allows us to obtain an estimate for every sector separately. The
estimated coefficients combined with the sectors relative size and the constructed mea-
sure Ej, we would then be able to identify the sector that would experience a stronger
growth in exports. The specification is as follows:
Xijt = ait + bij +Â
j2J
gj ⇥ Dj ⇥ DPt + eijt (5)
where Dj = 1 if a exports between the US and country i at time t fall in three digit
sector j.
The results obtained from using this alternative measure of energy intensity are
similar to our main results. The results are presented in Table 6. The most striking
observation is that, in particular, non-durable chemical processing industries are expe-
riencing strong positive export growth (NAICS sectors 321-327) and energy intensive
durable goods, in particular Metal Manufacturing. These results are consistent with the
parametric estimates.
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U.S. regional variation in natural gas prices As highlighted in Fetzer (2014), regional
natural gas price differences could be relevant. In appendix A.3, we present results from
a specification using an unbalanced panel with the added dimension of US customs
district origin. We map natural gas prices to US customs districts and can augment
the analysis of the above specification to include the within-US price differences. The
coefficients are smaller, but comparable, as we exploit more variation in natural gas
prices.
Accounting for Secular Trend One other concern is that the boom in shale gas pro-
duction and the subsequent widening of the price differences is correlated with another
trend that drives energy intensive exports. Indeed, the existing trade literature empha-
sises the global trends of labour intensive production occurring in countries with a
comparative advantage in labor, while only the capital intensive production remains in
developed countries. If energy-intensive sectors are, at the same time, capital intensive,
the estimated effects of the shale gas revolution could then be contaminated. Consid-
ering that our estimates are virtually unaffected when including additional interaction
terms capturing the sectors relative labor- or capital intensity, we can confidently ascer-
tain that our results are not driven by the above mentioned trend (see Table 7).
Accounting for Price Differences Since the estimated regressions include trade value
denominated in US dollar, they could be capturing changes in mark-ups and prices in
general. This is unlikely to be a concern since the time-fixed effects and the sector by
trading partner fixed effects absorb a lot of the characteristics, such as differences in
exchange rates. Nevertheless, we can perform the main analysis using a crude proxy
of the trade volume in real terms, by studying the overall weight of all exports.26 The
results studying the weight of exports are presented in Appendix Table A6. The point
estimates are slightly lower for some specifications, but are very much comparable to
our main results.
6 Conclusion
This paper provided empirical evidence of the newly found comparative advantage of
U.S. manufacturing following the so-called shale gas revolution. The revolution has
led to (very) large and persistent differences in the price of natural gas between the
United States and the rest of the world owing to the physical properties of natural gas
combined with the distance to foreign markets-energy losses stemming from the lique-
faction process alone range from 11-30 percent. Estimation results of gravity models
show that U.S. manufacturing exports have grown by about 6 percent on account of
26This is computed by summing the Air Shipping Weight, Vessel Shipping Weight and Containerized
Vessel Shipping Weight variables in the trade data.
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their energy intensity since the onset of the shale revolution. Using a data-set of invest-
ment in new and expanding manufacturing plants worth a million dollar and above,
we also document that the U.S. shale revolution is operating both at the intensive and
extensive margins with new manufacturing sector capacity being added in the energy
intensive industries.
From a policy perspective, the shale gas boom has led to a debate in the United
States about whether relaxing the restrictions on exporting natural gas would diminish
the gains in external competitiveness resulting from lower domestic natural gas prices.
The U.S. is indeed expected to join the legion of liquefied natural gas exporters and even
become a net exporter of natural gas later this decade according to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (2014). As noted earlier, liquefaction and transportation
costs would make exporting liquefied natural gas economical only at relatively high
prices prevailing in other markets. The price differential between the U.S. compared
to Asia and Europe is thus likely to persist in turn helping lift U.S. manufacturing.
Considering the much higher degree of tradability of oil, the removal of restrictions on
crude oil exports from the U.S. would be more consequential than for natural gas in
making domestic prices higher and in reducing international crude oil prices.
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Tables for Main Text
Table 1: Energy Intensity and Relative Sector Size of Exporting NAICS3 Sectors according
to 2002 Input Output Table
Industry NAICS Sector Size Energy Cost Natural Gas Cost Labour Cost
Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct
Food Manufacturing 311 2.36% 4.08% 2.02% 1.87% 0.85% 26.76% 13.59%
Beverage and Tobacco 312 0.62% 2.26% 0.85% 0.94% 0.27% 17.94% 7.54%
Textile Mills 313 0.23% 5.83% 3.26% 2.14% 0.85% 38.18% 21.96%
Textile Product Mill 314 0.16% 3.46% 1.25% 1.34% 0.47% 33.40% 18.68%
Apparel Manufacturin 315 0.21% 3.06% 1.31% 1.72% 0.75% 39.09% 20.54%
Leather and Allied P 316 0.03% 2.62% 1.20% 1.25% 0.52% 37.71% 22.89%
Wood Product Manufac 321 0.46% 3.31% 1.77% 1.23% 0.41% 37.97% 22.91%
Paper Manufacturing 322 0.79% 7.65% 3.82% 4.33% 1.75% 32.68% 18.80%
Printing and Related 323 0.51% 3.00% 1.28% 1.24% 0.29% 47.78% 33.17%
Petroleum and Coal P 324 1.10% 78.21% 66.09% 76.24% 65.31% 12.74% 3.55%
Chemical Manufacturi 325 2.30% 8.33% 3.11% 5.90% 1.63% 28.33% 12.45%
Plastics and Rubber 326 0.88% 4.33% 2.22% 1.56% 0.39% 38.76% 24.85%
Nonmetallic Mineral 327 0.48% 8.38% 4.28% 4.60% 2.06% 40.59% 25.21%
Primary Metal Manufa 331 0.72% 9.15% 4.86% 3.57% 1.55% 36.55% 21.76%
Fabricated Metal Pro 332 1.25% 3.57% 1.56% 1.44% 0.49% 45.85% 29.97%
Machinery Manufactur 333 1.23% 2.27% 0.81% 0.82% 0.19% 44.75% 25.95%
Computer and Electro 334 1.79% 1.73% 0.74% 0.46% 0.13% 42.45% 22.00%
Electrical Equipment 335 0.51% 2.36% 0.97% 0.78% 0.23% 39.41% 23.55%
Transportation Equip 336 3.25% 1.85% 0.63% 0.63% 0.19% 37.99% 18.19%
Furniture and Relate 337 0.38% 2.38% 0.93% 0.77% 0.22% 44.90% 29.23%
Miscellaneous Manufa 339 0.64% 1.80% 0.71% 0.57% 0.15% 41.46% 27.39%
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Table 2: Exports by Commodity and Destination Country: Expansion of Energy Inten-
sive Exports
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity 0.238*** 0.212*** 0.037*** 0.223***
⇥ Price Gap (0.023) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020)
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 400587 400587 400587 400587
R-squared .887 .887 .886 .887
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity 0.248*** 0.222*** 0.033*** 0.221***
⇥ Price Gap (0.034) (0.027) (0.010) (0.028)
Clusters 86 86 86 86
Observations 175089 175089 175089 175089
R-squared .901 .901 .901 .901
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity 0.258*** 0.226*** 0.035* 0.220***
⇥ Price Gap (0.044) (0.038) (0.019) (0.041)
Clusters 28 28 28 28
Observations 56197 56197 56197 56197
R-squared .928 .928 .927 .928
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant destination industrial use price
and the US industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all destination countries. Panel
B uses computed OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the sample to include only
OECD countries with price data available. The dependent variable is the log of the value of exports. All
regressions include destination by year fixed effects and destination by product fixed effects. The Energy
Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure
used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy
consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods.
Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Intensive Margin Exports by Commodity and Destination Country
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity 0.263*** 0.246*** 0.039*** 0.249***
⇥ Price Gap (0.024) (0.019) (0.008) (0.021)
Clusters 199 199 199 199
Observations 266645 266645 266645 266645
R-squared .895 .895 .894 .895
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity 0.252*** 0.230*** 0.031*** 0.224***
⇥ Price Gap (0.037) (0.031) (0.011) (0.033)
Clusters 77 77 77 77
Observations 131683 131683 131683 131683
R-squared .906 .906 .905 .906
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity 0.241*** 0.217*** 0.024 0.211***
⇥ Price Gap (0.044) (0.040) (0.017) (0.044)
Clusters 27 27 27 27
Observations 49940 49940 49940 49940
R-squared .931 .931 .93 .931
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant destination industrial use price and
the US industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all destination countries. Panel B uses
computed OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the sample to include only OECD
countries with price data available. The dataset is constrained to those destination- commodity pairs that
reported strictly positive trade throughout the sample period. All regressions include destination by year
fixed effects and destination by product fixed effects. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1)
and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on
natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and
(4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the
destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Extensive Margin Exports by Commodity and Destination Country
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity 0.265*** 0.330*** 0.179*** 0.206***
⇥ Price Gap (0.086) (0.074) (0.033) (0.070)
Mean DV .03 .03 .03 .03
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 661487 661487 661487 661487
R-squared .437 .437 .437 .437
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity 0.134 0.162* 0.110** 0.066
⇥ Price Gap (0.094) (0.082) (0.043) (0.077)
Mean DV .03 .03 .03 .03
Clusters 86 86 86 86
Observations 238810 238810 238810 238810
R-squared .573 .573 .573 .573
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity 0.225** 0.239** 0.130** 0.160*
⇥ Price Gap (0.109) (0.104) (0.054) (0.080)
Mean DV .03 .03 .03 .03
Clusters 28 28 28 28
Observations 59285 59285 59285 59285
R-squared .853 .853 .853 .853
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant destination industrial use price
and the US industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all destination countries. Panel B
uses computed OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the sample to include only OECD
countries with price data available. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes that value of 1 if there is
non-zero exports following three consecutive years of no exports and 0 otherwise. All regressions include
destination by year fixed effects and destination by product fixed effects. The coefficients are multiplied
by 100 for easier exposition. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types
of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption.
Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect
energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Manufacturing Sector Capital Expenditures at the County Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any log(Project Count) log(Investment) log(Jobs)
Panel A: Total Capital Expenditure
Energy Intensity 0.109** 0.401* 0.267* 0.401*
⇥ Price Gap (0.052) (0.221) (0.145) (0.221)
Mean of DV .0288 .0369 .999 3.01
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 718179 718179 718179 718179
R-squared .284 .299 .289 .303
Panel B: Capital Expenditure for New Projects
Energy Intensity 0.066** 0.048** 0.271** 0.236**
⇥ Price Gap (0.029) (0.023) (0.106) (0.117)
Mean of DV .0129 .0149 .549 1.38
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 718179 718179 718179 718179
R-squared .2 .229 .188 .208
Notes: Panel A uses total Capital Expenditure, which includes capacity expansions and completely new capacity.
Panel B only uses completely new capacity. The Price Gap is measured as the price difference between OECD Europe
and the US industrial prices. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for better exposition. All regressions control for
state-by-year fixed effects and county by industry fixed effects. Column (1) is a linear probability model if there is any
investment, column (2) uses the log of the number of projects per county and industry, while column (3) uses the log
of investment amount in millions of US dollars. Column (4) uses the log of the total number of jobs created. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Energy Intensity and Export Growth : Estimated Effects at the 3 digit Sector Level
NAICS Label Energy Cost Share Share of Exports Estimate SE
312 Beverage and Tobacco 2.26% 0.54% -0.022 0.021
313 Textile Mills 5.83% 0.68% -0.048 0.014 ***
314 Textile Product Mill 3.46% 0.23% -0.031 0.011 **
315 Apparel Manufacturin 3.06% 0.24% -0.010 0.013
316 Leather and Allied P 2.62% 0.22% -0.029 0.014 **
321 Wood Product Manufac 3.31% 0.47% -0.020 0.022
322 Paper Manufacturing 7.65% 1.94% 0.016 0.018
323 Printing and Related 3.00% 0.47% -0.040 0.018 **
324 Petroleum and Coal P 78.21% 8.73% 0.097 0.020 ***
325 Chemical Manufacturi 8.33% 14.92% 0.038 0.020 *
326 Plastics and Rubber 4.33% 2.27% 0.033 0.018 *
327 Nonmetallic Mineral 8.38% 0.80% 0.003 0.017
331 Primary Metal Manufa 9.15% 5.88% 0.047 0.021 **
332 Fabricated Metal Pro 3.57% 3.18% 0.040 0.021 *
333 Machinery Manufactur 2.27% 12.48% 0.022 0.027
334 Computer and Electro 1.73% 9.79% -0.056 0.020 **
335 Electrical Equipment 2.36% 2.93% 0.007 0.022
336 Transportation Equip 1.85% 10.53% 0.006 0.027
337 Furniture and Relate 2.38% 0.39% -0.003 0.016
339 Miscellaneous Manufa 1.80% 3.48% 0.011 0.019
Notes: Table presents NAICS3 sector specific effect of US to OECD regional gas price differences on sector
specific exports. The coefficients are semi-elasticities, indicating the % change in exports for a commodity if the
price gap increases by one USD. The Energy Cost Share is the total energy consumed based on input-output
tables, directly via all main sources of primary energy and indirectly, through intermediate goods. Share of
Exports presents the relative size of a sector in terms of overall export share for the period before 2005.
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Table 7: Energy Intensity and Export Growth: Interaction
Effects with Other Sector Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Energy Intensity 0.238*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.205***
⇥ Price Gap (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Capital Intensity -0.062*** -0.082***
⇥ Price Gap (0.011) (0.011)
Labor Intensity -0.037*** -0.076***
⇥ Price Gap (0.014) (0.015)
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 400587 400587 400587 400587
R-squared .887 .887 .887 .887
Notes: Estimating heterogenous effects by other factor intensities. The
Price Gap is computed as the gap between US industrial use natural
gas prices and OECD region specific industrial use natural gas prices.
Details on the computation of Energy- , Capital and Labor intensity
are provided in Appendix A.2. Standard errors are clustered at the
destination country with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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A Appendix
A.1 Trade Data
This part of the appendix describes how the trade data of Schott (2008) was processed to
construct two data sets that are used in this paper. The two data sets are: (1) a balanced
panel of trade between the US and partner countries at the five digit sector code level
and (2) an unbalanced panel of trade between US customs districts and trade partner
countries at the five digit sector code level.
In order to arrive at the second data set, some processing of Schott (2008) data is
necessary. The data are provided at the harmonised system (HS) product code classifi-
cation for trade data. The trade data have four panel dimensions: origin or destination
US customs district c, product code j, and origin or destination country i in year t.27
The product codes j data are mapped to 7-digit North American Industry Classification
Codes (NAICS) using the routine detailed in Pierce and Schott (2012a). As the Input-
Output tables are computed using combined NAICS codes for several sectors, we map
the 7 digit NAICS sectors to 5 digit NAICS sectors, by aggregating import- and export
flows on the panel identifiers i, c, t and the transformed 5 digit product code j. In total,
there are 167 NAICS5 sectors, 18 years of data, 233 of countries with which the US
trades and 44 US customs districts.
The result of this collapse is the second data set that is used for robustness to high-
light, that the within-US price variation in natural gas prices does not add a significant
dimension to the analysis. The data set has roughly 4 million observations, but is highly
unbalanced as there are many US customs districts that do not trade with other coun-
tries for certain product codes. A balanced panel would consist of around 167 x 18 x
233 x 44 = 30.8 million observations, out of which only these 4 million observations are
zero.
The main data set used in the analysis removes the US customs district dimension
by collapsing the data. This makes the data set a lot more manageable with only 167 x
18 x 233 = 700,398 observations.
A.2 Energy Intensity from Input-Output Tables
We use the approach discussed in Fetzer (2014) to construct the energy intensity of the
five digit industries using the 2002 Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output table.
The input-output use table provide for each industry, a break-down of all direct costs
by commodity that the industry incurs to achieve its level of output.
The direct energy cost is computed as the sum of the costs that an industry in-
curs using direct energy commodities. Energy commodities are considered to be those
produced by the following following six digit NAICS industries:
27I refer to product and sector codes j interchangably.
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NAICS 6 Industry Name
211000 Oil and gas extraction
221100 Electric power generation and distribution
221200 Natural gas distribution
486000 Pipeline transportation
S00101 Federal electric utilities
S00202 State electric utilities
Table A1: Input Output Table Direct Natural Gas Consumption
Unfortunately, the Oil and gas extraction sector is not further decomposed into nat-
ural gas- or oil extraction, which adds some noise to the measurement. Nevertheless,
the table provides all direct energy consumption and captures the three ways that nat-
ural gas can be consumed. The three ways to consume natural gas directly follow from
the deregulation of the industry which ultimately separated natural gas extraction from
transportation. This was achieved in a lengthy regulatory process, beginning with the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and subsequent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) orders No. 436 in 1985 and 636 in 1992. These orders ultimately separate the
extraction from the transportation process, mandating open access to pipelines which
allows end-consumers or local distribution companies (LDCs) to directly purchase nat-
ural gas from the producers.
The three ways natural gas is (purchased) for consumption are:
1. Direct Purchases from the Oil and Gas Extraction Sector, in addition to costs for
Pipeline Transportation (NAICS 211000, 486000).
2. Indirect Purchases Through Natural Gas Distribution Utilities (NAICS 2212000
and 486000).
3. Indirect Purchases Through Electric Utilities using natural gas for power genera-
tion (NAICS 2211000, S00101 and S00202).
Now, we can further refine this as natural gas is also indirectly consumed through
the value chain in form of intermediate products. In order to account for this indirect
consumption, we perform the above step iteratively. Since we know the energy cost
share for each commodity, we can compute the energy cost component of each inter-
mediate input and simply add these costs up. This allows us to compute the indirect
energy cost share.
We proceed in the same way to compute the labor cost share. In the input-output
table, each sector reports its labor costs. We simply compute the direct and indirect
labor cost share using the same method.
Last, but not least, we compute Capital Intensity of a sector. We follow the approach
in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006), who construct capital intensity of a sector as:
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Kj =
VAj  Wj
VAj
where VAj is nominal value added in sector j and Wj is the wage bill of that sector.
The three components of value added are (1) compensation of employees, (2) taxes on
production and imports less subsidies, and (3) gross operating surplus.
The resulting time invariant measures are merged with the trade data. For some
sectors, we have to compute the energy intensity at a four digit level, as the NAICS
codes in the input output tables combine several sector codes or are only available at
the four digit sector level.
A.3 Exploiting Within-US Natural Gas Prices
As highlighted in Fetzer (2014), the shale gas boom has lead to some price discrepancies
within the US, which are partly due to a lack of physical pipeline capacity, but also due
to high transport costs within pipelines over long distances. These transport costs are
however, very small, in comparison to the transport costs when considering shipping
natural gas as LNG. Nevertheless, we explore here whether within-US price differences
provide dramatically different estimates as compared with the main results in the paper.
We do so by performing the same regressions as in the main Table 2, except that
we retain the US customs district dimension as described in Appendix A.1. We map
Industrial use natural gas price data with the unbalanced panel. The industrial use
natural gas price data was obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA)
and is available at the state-level from 1997 onwards. When doing this map, we make a
strong assumption, that the US origin customs district is also the location of production
or consumption for the goods that are exported or imported.
We estimate very similar specifications:
Xijct = aict + bijc + g⇥ Ej ⇥ DPct + eijct (6)
excpet that now the unit of observation also has the US customs district c dimension.
As before, the fixed effects aict control trade-pair time effects that are not sector specific
(such as exchange rates). The other demand shifters bijc also add the US customs district
dimension. Most importantly, we can now adjust our measure for the price gap Pct, to
account for the price differences across US customs districts.
The results from this regressions are presented in Table A2.
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Online Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure A1: Share and Absolute Size of Manufacturing Sector Employment
Figure A2: Energy Content of US exports and expansion of shale gas production as a
share of overall dry natural gas production in the US.
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Figure A3: Share of Overall Exports or Imports of Energy Intensive Sectors. Classified
as Energy Intensive are 3 digit sectors 324, 325, 326, 327, 331 and 332.
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Table A2: Exports by US Customs District, Commodity and Destination Country: Ex-
pansion of Energy Intensive Exports
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity 0.164*** 0.146*** 0.036*** 0.151***
⇥ Price Gap (0.014) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 2534603 2534603 2534603 2534603
R-squared .775 .775 .775 .775
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.018*** 0.097***
⇥ Price Gap (0.018) (0.015) (0.006) (0.016)
Clusters 86 86 86 86
Observations 1492881 1492881 1492881 1492881
R-squared .784 .784 .784 .784
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity 0.113*** 0.103*** 0.013 0.105***
⇥ Price Gap (0.028) (0.024) (0.008) (0.026)
Clusters 28 28 28 28
Observations 686279 686279 686279 686279
R-squared .813 .813 .813 .813
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant US customs district industrial use
natural price and the relevant destination industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all
destintation countries. Panel B uses computed OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the
sample to include only OECD countries with price data available. The dependent variable is the log of
the value of total exports. All regressions include destination by year fixed effects and US customs district
origin by destination by product fixed effects. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2)
focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural
gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also
includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the destination
country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Effect on Export Levels by Commodity and Destination Country
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity 45.294*** 32.554*** 6.799*** 37.063***
⇥ Price Gap (11.348) (8.119) (1.823) (9.268)
Mean DV 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 661487 661487 661487 661487
R-squared .833 .832 .831 .833
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity 37.640*** 27.090*** 4.982*** 30.589***
⇥ Price Gap (14.175) (9.891) (1.855) (11.412)
Mean DV 38.66 38.66 38.66 38.66
Clusters 86 86 86 86
Observations 238810 238810 238810 238810
R-squared .853 .853 .852 .853
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity 84.077** 61.373** 11.313** 67.818**
⇥ Price Gap (37.705) (26.346) (5.242) (30.577)
Mean DV 118.24 118.24 118.24 118.24
Clusters 28 28 28 28
Observations 59285 59285 59285 59285
R-squared .87 .87 .869 .87
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant destination industrial use price and the
US industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all destination countries. Panel B uses com-
puted OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the sample to include only OECD countries
with price data available. The dependent variable is the level of the value of exports. All regressions include
destination by year fixed effects and destination by product fixed effects. The Energy Intensity measure
used in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3)
and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while
columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are
clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
34
Table A4: Effect on Log(Imports) by Commodity and Country Imports: No Discernible
Effect on Imports
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity 0.030 0.048* -0.043*** 0.052**
⇥ Price Gap (0.031) (0.026) (0.013) (0.026)
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 231493 231493 231493 231493
R-squared .9 .9 .9 .9
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity -0.004 0.006 -0.039** 0.023
⇥ Price Gap (0.037) (0.033) (0.017) (0.032)
Clusters 86 86 86 86
Observations 129849 129849 129849 129849
R-squared .905 .905 .905 .905
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity -0.017 -0.023 -0.026 0.009
⇥ Price Gap (0.044) (0.043) (0.022) (0.040)
Clusters 28 28 28 28
Observations 53951 53951 53951 53951
R-squared .916 .916 .916 .916
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant import origin industrial use price
and the US industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all origin countries. Panel B uses
computed OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the sample to include only OECD coun-
tries with price data available. The dependent variable is the log of the value of imports. All regressions
include origin by year fixed effects and destination by product fixed effects. The coefficients are multiplied
by 100 for easier exposition. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types
of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption.
Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect
energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Effect on Extensive Margin to Import by Commodity and Country
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity -0.018 0.149** -0.056 0.065
⇥ Price Gap (0.090) (0.075) (0.036) (0.078)
Mean DV .05 .05 .05 .05
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 661487 661487 661487 661487
R-squared .284 .284 .284 .284
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity -0.101 0.056 -0.015 -0.001
⇥ Price Gap (0.109) (0.097) (0.055) (0.101)
Mean DV .06 .06 .06 .06
Clusters 86 86 86 86
Observations 238810 238810 238810 238810
R-squared .399 .399 .399 .399
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity -0.148 0.028 0.123 -0.002
⇥ Price Gap (0.268) (0.218) (0.091) (0.217)
Mean DV .06 .06 .06 .06
Clusters 28 28 28 28
Observations 59285 59285 59285 59285
R-squared .768 .768 .768 .768
Notes Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant origin industrial use price
and the US industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all origin countries. Panel B
uses computed OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the sample to include only
OECD countries with price data available. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes that value
of 1 if there is non-zero imports following three consecutive years of no imports and 0 otherwise. All
regressions include destination by year fixed effects and destination by product fixed effects. The Energy
Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure
used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct
energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate
goods. Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Effect on Export Weight by Commodity and Destination Country
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: OECD Europe versus US
Energy Intensity 0.167*** 0.181*** 0.036*** 0.182***
⇥ Price Gap (0.025) (0.021) (0.009) (0.022)
Clusters 233 233 233 233
Observations 398068 398068 398068 398068
R-squared .848 .848 .848 .848
Panel B: OECD Regional versus US
Energy Intensity 0.177*** 0.198*** 0.013 0.180***
⇥ Price Gap (0.029) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024)
Clusters 86 86 86 86
Observations 173706 173706 173706 173706
R-squared .857 .857 .857 .857
Panel C: OECD Country versus US
Energy Intensity 0.160*** 0.180*** 0.012 0.156***
⇥ Price Gap (0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.037)
Clusters 28 28 28 28
Observations 55970 55970 55970 55970
R-squared .872 .872 .872 .872
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the relevant origin industrial use price and the
US industrial use price. Panel A uses OECD Europe price for all origin countries. Panel B uses computed
OECD regional prices where available. Panel C restricts the sample to include only OECD countries with
price data available. The dependent variable is the log of total export weight in tons. All regressions
include destination by year fixed effects and destination by product fixed effects. The Energy Intensity
measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used
in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy
consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods.
Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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Table A7: Manufacturing Sector Capital Expenditures by County and Industry - Restricting to
Counties not on Shale Deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any log(Project Count) log(Investment) log(Jobs)
Panel A: Total Capital Expenditure
Energy Intensity 0.070 0.401* 0.142 0.253
⇥ Price Gap (0.052) (0.221) (0.136) (0.229)
Mean of DV .0288 .0369 .999 3.01
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 545622 718179 545622 545622
R-squared .263 .299 .271 .278
Panel B: Capital Expenditure for New Projects
Energy Intensity 0.046* 0.033 0.195** 0.160
⇥ Price Gap (0.027) (0.023) (0.089) (0.115)
Mean of DV .0129 .0149 .549 1.38
Clusters 49 49 49 49
Observations 545622 545622 545622 545622
R-squared .192 .22 .184 .199
Notes: Dataset is restricted to only include counties that do not have shale deposits. Panel A uses total Capital
Expenditure, which includes capacity expansions and completely new capacity. Panel B only uses completely new
capacity. The Price Gap is measured as the price difference between OECD Europe and the US industrial prices.
Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for better exposition. All regressions control for state-by-year fixed effects and
county by industry fixed effects. Column (1) is a linear probability model if there is any investment, column (2) uses
the log of the number of projects per county and industry, while column (3) uses the log of investment amount in
millions of US dollars. Column (4) uses the log of the total number of jobs created. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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